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THE COOPTING OF A FREE AND FAIR PRESS BY PRIVATE MEDIA
CONGLOMERIZATION
Jason Mushnick

Introduction
Throughout the 20th Century and into the 21st Century, ownership of major media outlets
has drifted into the hands of corporate giants.1 These giants are corporate conglomerates that are
not merely engaged in entertainment and news media, but also production and distribution
companies.2 As a result, editorial decisions regarding national news coverage have developed a
bottom line, not to inform the public, but based on making a profit.3 As stated by Ben Bagdikian
in The New Media Monopoly:
In 1983, the men and women who headed the fifty mass media
corporations that dominated American audiences could have fit
comfortably in a modest hotel ballroom. . . . By 2003, five men
controlled all these media once run by the fifty corporations twenty
years earlier. These five owners of additional digital corporations,
could fit in a generous phone booth. Granted, it would be a tight
fit, and it would be filled with some tensions.4
As a result, editorial decisions regarding national news coverage have developed a
bottom line, not to inform the public, but based on making a profit.5
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Given that the concentration of media ownership is in the hands of a few publicly traded
companies with an interest in making a profit, the media’s main focus is on how to attract the
largest audience. The decision for a person to consume a type of media will depend on whether
they identify with the particular coverage expressed in that media.6
Economic forces dictate that media coverage will be based on how a media outlet can
achieve the largest audience. For instance, James T. Hamilton in All the News That’s Fit to Sell:
How the Market Transforms Information into News showed that newspapers which tend to be
distributed mainly in local cities, beginning toward the end of the Twentieth Century have
become more independent rather than partisan.7 This occurred because independent papers were
more likely to attract a larger scale of association, which meant that advertisers were more likely
to place ads in those papers.8 However, Hamilton also shows that network evening news
programs on television tend to have a core of loyal viewers and some marginal viewers that may
or may not tune in.9 Network news programs compete for marginal viewers and make content
decisions based on what they want.10 The directors place more value on young adults (18-34),
particularly women, as this is the demographic most likely to be making purchasing decisions in
a household. Therefore, advertisers are more likely to place an ad on a program that attracts this
demographic. Because younger females take an interest in political issues that have a more
liberal bias, network news programs, particularly from the three major network evening news
programs, began to focus on topics traditionally associated with the Democratic party. 11 More,
recently there has been a significant increase in cable channels and viewership of any one
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channel has decreased. This fostered the possibility of a conservative news channel to become
profitable, and so the Fox News Channel was born.12
The effect of concentrated ownership of the media has resulted in more coverage of, what
Hamilton calls, soft news and less focus on hard news. Soft news stories are stories that tend to
focus on human interest and entertainment figures, while hard news has an emphasis on the
government and politics.13 Because younger female audiences are more interested in soft news
stories, the media outlets are more likely to cover such stories in order to turn a greater profit. 14
Further, soft news stories are less expensive to make and the payoff for making hard news stories
is not worth the extra expense and effort.15 Therefore, the increased concentration of ownership
of media outlets in the hands of publicly traded firms results in a less informed public due to the
focus on soft media topics.
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”16 Interpretations of the First Amendment have been
conflicting.17 However, the intent of the Amendment is to give the public a voice and ensure that
a diversity of views are communicated as to all subjects in order maintain an informed public.18
A further purpose of the First Amendment, as will be discussed later in this paper, is to keep the
media and news out of the hands of the hands of any one person or group, such as the
government, in order to ensure an effective democracy. Because ownership of the media is
becoming more and more consolidated into the hands of public corporations whose focus is on
making a profit and not to inform public discourse, the value of our First Amendment has greatly
12
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diminished. Presently, the only regulations used to check the media industry are antitrust laws.
Antitrust laws take on a concern primarily with the necessary amount of competition to keep any
one firm from taking over an industry. Since the 1980s, the FCC has been deregulating the media
industry with the idea that the industry should operate in a free, market-driven society.19 Further,
courts have started to reject any attempts to structurally regulate the media industry and often
cite to the First Amendment right for these companies to disseminate their views on as wide an
audience as possible. This interpretation is greatly stymying the First Amendment.
This paper will show why greater structural regulation of the media industry is necessary
to ensure that no one owner has a monopolistic hold on the industry and show that allowing the
media industry to operate in an open market with only antitrust laws regulating is actually a
violation of the First Amendment. Further, this paper will propose other potential regulations to
make the First Amendment carry out its intended purpose of viewpoint diversity and ensure that
all people have freedom of the press and not just a select few.
Part I of this paper will discuss the historical and philosophical antecedents of the First
Amendment freedom of the press. In Part II, this paper will discuss the deregulation of the media
industry that occurred in the 1980s and how this enabled conglomerization of the media. It will
also examine how the Supreme Court has dealt with this climate of deregulation. Part III will
discuss the problems with conglomerization of the media and the consequences this has on the
news we receive and the First Amendment. Finally, Part IV will provide a prescription for
reform.
I. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS
A. Freedom of the Press was Intended for All
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In forming the First Amendment, the founding fathers intended that freedom of press
prevent the government from having any power over the people’s right to speak, write, or
publish. This is probably why the Amendment begins, “Congress shall make no law. . .”
John Locke had a profound influence on the founders, mostly for his beliefs about liberty
and limited government. Locke, in Two Treatises of Government, stated that all men are born
with certain natural rights and born “in a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and
dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature,
without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.”20 He believed that all men
are born into a “state also of equality wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than another.”21 While he understood government to be necessary in order to
preserve each individual, their liberty and property, “the power of the society or legislative
constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good.” 22 Locke’s
work, being of great influence to the founding fathers, therefore, indoctrinated the ideas that all
are equal and that government should be limited only to protect the people, their liberty, and their
property.
The colonists were primarily concerned with the allocation of political power and “its
endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries.” 23 As such, many
pamphleteers of the time focused their writing around the need “to check the abuse of
governmental power.”24 Cato, the pen name for John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon 25, wrote of
the importance of free speech in checking the power of the government: “Whoever would
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overthrow the Liberty of a Nation must begin by subduing the Freeness of Speech; a Thing
terrible to publick Traytors.”26 John Wilkes, an English politician and polemicist admired by the
colonists, emphasized the checking value of freedom of the press:
The liberty of the press is the birth-right of a Briton, and is justly
esteemed the firmest bulwark of the liberties of this county. It has
been the terror of all bad ministers; for their dark and dangerous
designs, or their weakness, inability, and duplicity . . . . A wicked
and corrupt administration must naturally dread this appeal to the
world; and will be for keeping all the means of information equally
from the prince, parliament and people.27
This body of thought, emphasizing the significance of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press as a means to check abuses of government power, became the bedrock for the First
Amendment.
James Madison, widely recognized as the “father” of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights28, was responsible for drafting the First Amendment.29 Madison discussed the freedom of
the press in the Virginia Report of 1799-1800, which was intended to be a criticism of the Alien
and Sedition Acts. The Sedition Act of 1798 was passed by Congress under President John
Adams due to hostile relations between government officials and editors and owners of
newspapers.30 Following enactment of the Sedition Act were a series of prosecutions sending
editors to jail, fining them, and even closing down some publications for criticizing or
denigrating the Adams administration.31
In the Virginia Report, Madison spoke of the difference between the British legal
doctrine of freedom of the press and the American system. In England, the legislature was
26
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regarded from distrust and also considered to be “sufficient guardians of the rights of their
constituents against the danger from the executive.” However, Madison stated, “[I]n the United
States, the executive magistrates are not held to be infallible, nor the legislatures to be
omnipotent; and both being elective, are both responsible.”32 Therefore, Madison concluded that
the meaning of freedom of the press should be held to a broader standard than England, which
permitted criminal punishment for seditious libel.33 Because the government did not have
unlimited power and likewise could also make mistakes, Madison believed freedom of the press
was necessary to criticize government officials who breach the public trust. The extent of the
breach “could only be determined by a free examination thereof, and a free communication
among the people thereon.”34 Madison placed much emphasis on the value of the electorate in
the checking process, especially the need to check errors of judgment and illegal or despotic
actions by officials.35
It is no surprise that in 1800, when Madison’s mentor, Thomas Jefferson, was elected to
be president that the Sedition Act expired and President Jefferson pardoned anyone convicted
under it.36 Jefferson, also a founding father, with much influence on Madison at the time the Bill
of Rights was written, believed strongly in the checking value of the First Amendment. Jefferson
stated in a letter to Adamantios Coray that “[t]his formidable censor of the public functionaries,
by arraigning them at the tribunal of public opinion, produces reform peaceably, which must
otherwise be done by revolution.”37
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The above paragraphs show the predominant view of the First Amendment centered on
the necessity of the freedom of the press to enable free expression of opinions as to the workings
of the government and to serve as check on officials and potential abuses of power. Today, many
people contend that freedom of the press was intended to provide freedom to the press as an
industry--meaning businesses in the newspaper trade.38 This is the view often used by
corporations in the courts when asserting structural regulation of the media industry violates their
First Amendment right to express their opinions to the widest audience possible. However,
history shows that First Amendment was intended not to protect merely the press as an industry
but the right of all people to the press as a technology.
The writings of Eugene Volokh offer evidence that freedom of the press was intended it
was the right of every individual to have access to the printing press.39 The printing press was the
only means of widely disseminating speech to a broad audience. At the time, no other modes,
such as television or the internet were available. The press was a way of advancing in all
subjects, including science, religion, literature, and government.40 In other words, freedom of the
press was not intended to protect primarily those that were in the industry of the press. Freedom
of the press was intended to give all men the opportunity to widely distribute information and
enable public discourse.
More evidence that shows that freedom of the press was not intended to protect the
industry of the press as we know it today is that the newspapers of the era were small and had
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few if any paid writers.41 Those that argue the press clause was meant to provide more
protections to owners of the institutional press are mistaken as the press at the time of the
framing of the Amendment was a separate entity from journalism. The press was in the trade of
printing. Therefore, it cannot be so that the framers sought to give an industry (that did not exist
at the time) the sole voice as to public discourse in a democratic society.
Knowing what we do about the press at the time the First Amendment was written makes
it more apparent that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are separate entities. Freedom
of speech means “‘the privilege of speaking any thing without control’ and ‘the words freedom
of the press, which form a part of the same sentence, mean the privilege of printing any thing
without control.’”42
The founders purpose for the First Amendment was to provide a means of checking
government power by expressing any opinions favoring or disfavoring a government official’s
decisions and not allowing Congress to abridge this right in any way. Further, it is unlikely that
the founders intended to give this freedom just to those involved in the press industry and likely
intended to provide freedom of press as a technology for all as shown by Volokh. At the time the
First Amendment was written, any newspapers that existed were merely local and very small.
There is no way that the founders could have foreseen that huge publicly traded conglomerates
would run the press and enable it to operate on a national or even global scale, thereby, making it
difficult for much smaller companies to compete or attract an audience. Had they known just
how big these media corporations would become, while remaining in the hands of so few, they
probably would have changed the wording of the First Amendment altogether. Because they
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envisioned the press as a technology that could be used by all, they worded the First Amendment
to prevent Congress from abridging this right of all men to freedom of the press. However,
knowing what we do now, the founding fathers might have selected an earlier draft of the First
Amendment that had been written by James Madison: “The people shall not be deprived or
abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”43
B. A Market Place of Ideas: The Egalitarian View of the First Amendment
The intent of the First Amendment as expressed above is analogous to the egalitarian
philosophy of John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, written in 1859, which is most credited with
swaying the opinions of some Supreme Court Justices, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and
Louis Brandeis. In On Liberty, John Stewart Mill contends that society should never silence an
opinion because “[i]f the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” In doing so, Mill supports the
idea that a properly working society requires the expression of all opinions, no matter how
unpopular, to be voiced. Further, Mill stated the reason that no one authority should be provided
with an absolute power of opinion:

[T]he opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may
possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its
truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide
the question for all mankind, and exclude every other person from
the means of judging. To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because
they are sure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the
same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an
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assumption of infallibility. Its condemnation may be allowed to
rest on this common argument, not the worse for being common.44
Mill’s view that no one should have the authority to suppress an opinion is the same idea that
guided the First Amendment, specifically that it is the right of all to voice their opinions through
the printing press.45 Mill essentially believed that the success of a democratic society requires the
free trade in ideas, or a market place of ideas, so that ideas can refuted or proven in the search for
truth.
An egalitarian concept established by Mill that should be noted is the idea that “a[ny]
person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as
he likes in acting for another, under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own affairs.” 46
Building on this, Mill believed that while the State must respect the liberty of each individual
person, it is responsible with controlling the power that an individual possesses over others.47
This concept is analogous to Mill’s belief that education should not be “in whole or any large
part” in the hands of the State.48 Mill strongly believed in the goals individuality of character and
having a diversity of opinions. Of principle importance of achieving these goals, was diversity of
education.49 A State education would serve the purpose of developing similar viewpoints and
essentially mold them in a way “which pleases the predominant power.”50 It was Mill’s view that
“[a]n education established and controlled by the State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as one
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among many competing experiments, carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus, to
keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence.”51
A final point worth mentioning from On Liberty is Mill’s view of the place of the
government when “individuals may not do [a] particular thing so well, on the average, as the
officers of government.”52 Mill stated that “it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by
them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education.”53 Mill continues
that “[w]hat the State can usefully do, is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator
and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials.” 54 In other words, rather than forcing
its own experiments on others, the government’s responsibility is “to enable each experimentalist
to benefit by the experiments of others.”55
Justice Holmes first accepted this egalitarian approach to the First Amendment in his
dissent in Abrams v. U.S., where the defendants were convicted of violating provisions of the
Espionage Act of Congress.56 Abrams involved five defendants that were Russian immigrants
who distributed leaflets condemning the U.S. government's involvement in the Russian
Revolution.57 Three of the counts were that the defendants had conspired to unlawfully utter,
print, write and publish (1) disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of
government of the United States, (2) language intended to bring the United States government in
contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute, and (3) language intended to incite, provoke and
encourage resistance to the United States during the war.58 The fourth count “was that the
defendants conspired ‘when the United States was at war with the Imperial German Government,
51
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. . . by utterance, writing, printing and publication to urge, incite and advocate curtailment of
production of things and products . . . essential to the prosecution of the war.’”59 While the Court
upheld the convictions for these counts, Holmes dissented with the following egalitarian
reasoning:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . . While that experiment
is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.60
Holmes believed that no matter how unpopular an opinion and even if that opinion disputes the
fundaments of our government, that speech should be protected by the First Amendment unless it
poses an imminent danger. Justice Brandeis in his concurrence to the opinion of the Court in
Whitney v. California echoed the same beliefs as Holmes. Justice Brandeis added the threat of
discouraging unpopular thought through fear of punishment. He stated “that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of
safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and
that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”61
Mill’s beliefs about the necessity of a market place of ideas were present in the views
another Justice, William O. Douglas. In his concurring opinion in U.S. v. Rumely, Justice
Douglas stated: “Like the publishers of newspapers, magazines, or books, this publisher bids for
59
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the minds of men in the market place of ideas.”62Douglas believed that an individual’s fear of
criticism can be crippling to a society and that opinions that disagree with the views of the
majority are crucial.63
Further, Justice Black’s majority opinion in Associate Press v. U.S., which will be
discussed later in this paper, also dictates the egalitarian view that all opinions, including those
greatly contested by the majority, should have equal access to the press. This view has been
continually used by courts to uphold structural regulation of the media industry through antitrust
law. Most importantly, this view shows that the First Amendment provides for even more
regulation of the media industry than other free markets and the necessity of preventing media
monopolies is paramount to the success of the First Amendment.

II. CONTROLLING THE MEDIA: THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE MONOPOLY
A. Deregulation Making Way for Conglomerization
In the past, the Federal Communications commission (FCC) was the agency responsible
for regulating the mass media. The FCC’s policy initiatives centered on ownership, the scale and
scope of the businesses in the industry, and the content distributed or broadcasted. 64 The goal of
the FCC’s mass media regulation was to “promote programming that is relevant to important
public issues and interesting to viewers and listeners.”65 This led to a balancing act trying to
serve the interest of democratic debate and market efficiency where the FCC had to structure the
media market so “that [it] is both competitive enough to satisfy consumers’ desires and diverse
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enough to provide the range of information and viewpoints necessary for informed public
discourse.”66
Since the early 1980s, there was a shift toward deregulation of the media industry and
antitrust policy in general.67 The trend toward deregulation of antitrust policy had its roots in the
Chicago School of thought, which “became increasingly influential on policy and regulation in
the 1970s.”68 The Chicago School believed “that markets operate the most efficiently (and most
competitively) without regulatory interference, and their philosophy advocates minimal antitrust
enforcement and is extremely tolerant of mergers and industry consolidation.”69 The problem
with applying the Chicago School to the media industry is that it “applies a single set of
operational principles to a wide variety of industrial markets and contexts instead of considering
markets on a case-by-case basis.”70 The purpose of this paper is not to knock the Chicago School
as it pertains to most markets. However, the Chicago School fails to take into account the First
Amendment implications of allowing market consolidation of the media industry. 71 While
efficiency of the market in enabling wider distribution or broadcasting of content at a cheaper
cost is beneficial to First Amendment objectives, if it worthless if it does so in a way that only
enables the expression of certain opinions and fails to discuss certain topics at all.
The first major step toward surrendering multiple ownership rules occurred on October
20, 1983, when the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking as to the seven station rule that

66
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existed at the time.72 The seven station rule restricted the amount of television and AM and FM
radio stations that could be owned by the same entity to seven in each category.73 Its reasoning
for dispensing or amending the rule was a significant increase in the number of television
stations, AM stations and FM stations since the rule debuted in 1953.74 As a result, the
possibility for harmful concentration that would weaken diversity had diminished and the threat
of monopoly was not a concern.75 On August 3, 1984, the FCC replaced the seven station rule
with an interim twelve station rule that would remain until 1990.76 However, upon stay and
review of the FCC Order, on February 1, 1985, the FCC let go of the six-year sunset provision
on the twelve station rule. In 1992, the FCC continued to deregulate, allowing ownership of up to
eighteen AM and eighteen FM stations.77
Another

major

step

toward

deregulation

occurred

upon

enactment

of

the

Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“The TCA”). When the TCA passed, “the FCC received a
statutory mandate to consider repealing all remaining media ownership restrictions, including the
newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership ban.”78 The TCA completely deregulated national
ownership of radio stations and increased the proportion of the national television audience a
single owner could reach, from twenty-five percent to thirty-five percent79. Additionally, it
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“directed the FCC to reconsider remaining ownership limitations on a biennial basis to determine
whether they remain ‘necessary in the public interest.’”80
In June 2003, the FCC held a biennial review to determine whether the mass media
regulations were necessary to achieve the above policy objectives. 81 It found that at the time the
rules were promulgated the media markets were more concentrated then they were at the time of
the review.82 As such, the “rules governing media ownership no longer served the policy
objectives of competition, localism, and diversity for which they had been implemented.83 The
FCC ultimately did away with the media specific rules and left it to antitrust enforcement to keep
a check on consolidation of the media.84
Following this deregulation, five global media firms have come to “own most of the
newspapers, magazines, book publishers, motion picture studios, and radio and television
stations in the United States.”85 These five conglomerates that dominate the United States are
Time Warner, The Walt Disney Company, News Corporation, Viacom, and CBS86. Also, worth
mentioning is Bertelsmann SE & Co. KGaA, which is a German mass media corporation that in
2004 was the fifth largest media corporation in the United States.87 Throughout its history
Bertelsmann was owned by the Mohn family, which currently has a 19.1% stake in the company.
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The Bertelsmann Foundation, a non-profit think-tank founded by the Mohn family has an 80.9%
ownership stake in Bertelsmann.88
The largest of these five media conglomerates is Time Warner, Inc. On its 2012 Annual
Report, Time Warner classifies its businesses into three segments. First, it holds “[n]etworks,
consisting principally of cable television networks, premium pay and basic tier television
services and digital media properties. Second, it has a film and TV entertainment segment,
“consisting principally of feature film, television, home video and videogame production and
distribution.” Third, it possesses a publishing segment, “consisting principally of magazine
publishing and related websites as well as book publishing and marketing businesses.”89
Four of Time Warner’s biggest subsidiaries are Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc., HBO,
Time, Inc., and Warner Bros. HBO and Warner Bros. are primarily involved in the entertainment
side of the media.90 Turner owns and operates leading television networks, such as CNN, HLN,
TNT, and TBS.91 Time Inc. prides itself as being “one of the largest branded media companies in
the world,” engaging in print, online, and mobile communications. Some of its influential brands
are Time, People, Sports Illustrated, InStyle, and Real Simple. Further, its network of internet
sites, including time.com, cnnmoney.com, people.com and SI.com reaches over 40 million
unique users each month.
The Walt Disney Company is another firm that “caught the merger and acquisition fever
of the 1980s and 1990s.”92 In 1984, Michael Eisner was named ABC’s chairman and CEO.
Eisner had begun his career working for the FCC and then placing commercials for CBS.
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However, he began working at ABC after being noticed by Barry Diller, the head of programing
at ABC, who became his mentor. Eisner greatly impacted ABC upon becoming the CEO by
transforming it into the Walt Disney Company, especially through the acquisition of the
newspaper-broadcast chain ABC/Cap Cities. Presently, Disney’s media networks segment
“includes international and domestic cable television networks, a domestic broadcast television
network, television production operations, domestic and international television distribution,
domestic television stations, domestic broadcast radio networks and stations, and publishing and
digital operations.”93 The Walt Disney Company is involved in various other industries,
including Parks and Resorts, the Walt Disney Studios, Disney Consumer Products, and Disney
Interactive. In 2005, Robert Iger took over as chairman and CEO amid discontent among the
Board of Directors as to Eisner’s leadership.94
The third largest is News Corporation. News Corporation is run by Rupert Murdoch, its
Chairman and CEO.95 The corporation is a diversified global media company operating in six
different media segments, such as cable network programming, filmed entertainment, television,
direct broadcast satellite television, publishing, and another segment primarily consisting of
digital media properties.96
As stated by Ben Bagdikian in The New Media Monopoly, “two impulses seem to drive
Murdoch’s business life—the accumulation of as much media power as possible and the use of
that power to promote his deep-seated conservative politics.”97 Murdoch began in Australia
when his father gave him a control of a newspaper in Adelaide, a small part of his father’s news
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empire.98 Murdoch had his sights on running something much bigger when he left for England
where he soon owned “an afternoon sleazy tabloid and a Sunday paper full of overflowing
female bodies and sensational gossip” as well as two of the world’s most influential papers, the
Sunday Times and the Times.99
Murdoch continued to expand his empire into the United States. Notably, he acquired
ownership of the New York Post and also created his own radio and television network, Fox.
One acquisition at a time, Murdoch’s Fox Network has emerged as the fourth TV network.100
The Company’s television operations as of 2011 consisted of FOX, MyNetworkTV and the 27
television stations owned by the Company.101
Viacom and CBS were once owned under the same name of Viacom. However, in 2006,
they split with CBS taking on most of the operations of the corporation formally known as
Viacom. Presently, CBS has operations in the following segments: entertainment, cable
networks, publishing, local broadcasting, and outdoor advertising.102 According to its 2013
Annual Report:
[t]he CBS Television Network through CBS Entertainment, CBS
News and CBS Sports distributes a comprehensive schedule of
news and public affairs broadcasts, sports and entertainment
programming to more than 200 domestic affiliates reaching
throughout the U.S., including 16 of the Company's owned and
operated television stations, and to affiliated stations in certain
U.S. territories.103
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Meanwhile, the company that is now known as Viacom operates in the media networks
and filmed entertainment segments. Viacom’s media networks segment consists of MTV, VH1,
CMT, BET, Nickelodeon, Comedy Central, and various others. The filmed entertainment
segment consists of companies primarily involved in motion pictures and other entertainment
content.104 It is relevant that Sumner M. Redstone serves as Chairman of the Board for both CBS
Corporation and Viacom and he is the controlling shareholder of both companies.105
As evidenced above, the big five media conglomerates are very powerful and serve as the
primary information and news sources to the whole country. They operate in all mediums,
including newspaper, television, radio, internet, and book publishing. Not only is the media
focused in the hands of the big five, but these companies often take on joint ventures with each
other, similar to a cartel. For example, at the time Bagdikian published The New Media
Monopoly in 2004, Disney had twenty-six joint ventures with other corporations, mostly
competitors in the media industry.106 Similarly, Time Warner had 292 subsidiaries, twenty-two
of which were “joint ventures with other major corporations involved in varying degrees with
media operations.107 News Corporation had partnerships with major competitors, such as General
Electric (NBC) and Paramount (Viacom).108 In total, the big five media conglomerate had 141
joint ventures.109
Concentration of the media industry is even more troubling because although these
conglomerates are publicly traded and can have many shareholders, the power remains at the top.
104
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Each publicly traded company is supposed to have a board of directors that generally select the
executive who runs their enterprises.110 However, most corporations have a controlling
shareholder that can select a board favorable to their interests. Frequently, the directors are often
“interlocking” meaning the directors are either family members or friends who are also corporate
executives.111 For, example Murdoch family members sit on the News Corporation and has
eleven interlocking directors, who are also directors of British Airways, Compaq Computers,
Rothschild Investment Trust, a media company, and YankeeNets, a professional hockey team.112
Disney’s board also consists of interlocking directors, including one former U.S. senator.113
National Amusements, Inc., a theatre company owned by the Redstone family, owns controlling
stakes in both CBS and Viacom. Sumner Redstone presently sits as the Executive Chairman of
both Viacom and CBS, while Shari Redstone sits as the Non-Executive Vice Chair of both
boards.114 Finally, Time Warner has also had interlocking directors with many corporations in
various industries.115
The common interests of the board of directors with the executive officers they select has
resulted in indifference by the directors in the officers decisions. Additionally, it has not been
“unusual for strong executives [to be in a position] to select directors who are supposed to
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monitor them, which guarantees sympathy and permissiveness.”116 This will allow executives to
act both immorally, illegally, and in their own self interest.117 In an industry that has such
powerful influence over the ability to obtain information, form opinions, and serve as a check on
the government, the concentrated ownership of this industry without any structural regulation
will only pave the way for more corruption, which will be discussed in Part III.
B. The Supreme Court Coming to Terms with the New Media Monopoly
Even in 1945, arguments were made that any structural regulation of the media was an
“abridgment of the freedom of press guaranteed by the First Amendment.”118 In Associated Press
v. U.S., the government charged the Associated Press119, a cooperative association consisting of
more than 1200 newspaper publishers responsible for violating the Sherman Anti-trust Act by
setting up “a system of By-Laws which prohibited all AP members from selling news to nonmembers, and which granted each member powers to block its non-member competitors from
membership.”120 The Supreme Court held that the district court was correct in its finding that the
By-Laws of the Associated Press had restrained trade in violation of the Sherman Act by tying
“the hands of all of its numerous publishers, to the extent that they could not and did not sell any
part of their news so that it could reach any of their non-member competitors.”121 The majority
opinion by Justice Black shows that the First Amendment supports regulations made to ensure
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the flow of content to the widest possible audience.122 Justice Black, echoing the Opinions of
Justice Holmes and Brandeis above, stated:
The First Amendment, far from providing an argument against
application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to
the contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a
free press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that
the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does
not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge if they impose
restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom
to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to
publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine
to keep others from publishing is not.123
In the past, The Supreme Court has always upheld “congressional structural regulation of
the media, that is, regulation not tied to or aimed at suppressing particular media content against
assertions that the regulations violate the First Amendment rights of corporate owners.”124 A
good example is F.C.C. v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., where the Court had to determine
whether “regulations governing the permissibility of common ownership of a radio or television
broadcast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community” was a violation of the
First Amendment.125 The Court held the FCC “criteria for determining which existing
newspaper-broadcast combinations have an ‘effective monopoly’ in the ‘local marketplace of
ideas as well as economically’” to be constitutional.126 It reasoned that it is the responsibility of
the FCC to determine where the public interest lies by considering both First Amendment and
antitrust values—“in particular, . . . the First Amendment goal of achieving ‘the widest possible
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dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.”127 Most importantly, the
Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument “though designed to further the First
Amendment goal of achieving ‘the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources’”, the regulations, in fact, “violated the First amendment rights of
newspaper owners.”128 In so holding, the Court stated: “this argument ignores the fundamental
proposition that there is no ‘unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the
right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.’”129
The Court in Nat’l Citizens Comm. For Broad cited another important case pertaining to
a licensee’s right to monopolize the specific radio frequency licensed. Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, was decided by the Supreme Court in 1969 and ultimately held that a “li[c]ensee has
no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to
the exclusion of his fellow citizens.”130 In its decision, the Court upheld an FCC Order requiring
a radio station to provide a person attacked in a broadcast with a right of reply. 131 The Court
found that “[t]here is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from
requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and . . . to present those views and voices .
. . which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.”132 The Court cited to both
Associated Press and Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams stating that the purpose of the First
Amendment is to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee.”133
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Five years after Red Lion, the Court decided a similar case concerning a Florida right of
reply statute requiring newspapers to provide free space to a candidate to reply to criticism and
personal attacks made in the newspaper.134 In Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, the Court held
that because this was a restriction made by the government on content and an intrusion into the
functions of the editors, the statute violated the First Amendment. Tornillo and Red Lion seem to
contradict each other as they both involved a right of reply statute. It was not until 1994 when the
Supreme Court decided Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C. that this contradiction was resolved.
In 1994, amid the changing antitrust climate toward deregulation, the Supreme Court
decided Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C. This case involved the question of whether “mustcarry” provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
(“CTCPCA”) requiring cable operators to carry a certain amount of local broadcast television
stations violates the First Amendment rights of the cable operators.135 The Court found that
regulation imposed on cable operators should be looked at by the courts with stricter scrutiny
than regulations imposed on broadcast media.136 This is because “[t]he scarcity of broadcast
frequencies thus required the establishment of some regulatory mechanism to divide the
electromagnetic spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular broadcasters.”137 The
Court determined that a more intermediate level of scrutiny applied as the regulations here were
content neutral.138 It resolved this standard with Tornillo by showing that the right of reply
required in Tornillo was content based and required a strict scrutiny analysis. The regulation in
Tornillo “required any newspaper that assailed a political candidate's character to print, upon
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request by the candidate and without cost, the candidate's reply in equal space and
prominence.”139
However, since Turner, lower courts have been using the stricter tests established to
overturn structural regulation of the media industry. For example, in Time Warner Entm’t Co.,
L.P. v. F.C.C., the court found that a rule imposing “a 30% limit on the number of subscribers
that may be served by a multiple cable system operator. . . . interferes with petitioners' speech
rights by restricting the number of viewers to whom they can speak.”140 Further, the court held a
regulation to be invalid that made impermissible a cable operator’s use of 40% of its first
seventy-five channels for channels owned by its own affiliates.141 Because this regulation
impeded the operator’s editorial discretion, it violated their entitlement “to the protection of the
speech and press provisions of the First Amendment.”142 Similarly, in Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C.,
the court found that “it was arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to conclude that a cable
operator serving more than 30% of the market poses a threat either to competition or to diversity
in programming” as cable operators no longer have “bottleneck power over programming” due
to the entrance into the market by satellite and fiber optic providers. 143 Further, “the Commission
ha[d] failed to demonstrate that allowing a cable operator to serve more than 30% of all cable
subscribers would threaten to reduce either competition or diversity in programming.”144
In the Southern District of Florida, the court had to determine whether an ordinance
requiring cable television operators with access to broadband Internet transport services at rates,
terms, and conditions equal to those on which they provided such access to themselves was
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deemed to violate the operators' right to free speech.145 The court found that “[l]iberty of
circulating is as essential to [freedom of the press] as liberty of publishing; indeed, without the
circulation, the publication would be of little value.”146 Further, “[l]iberty of circulating is not
confined to newspapers and periodicals, pamphlets and leaflets, but also to delivery of
information by means of fiber optics, microprocessors and cable.147 Therefore, the court held
that the ordinance violated the intermediate level of scrutiny.148
III. PROBLEMS WITH CONCENTRATION OF THE MEDIA
Mass media companies control much of the news stories that receive national attention.149
This means that corporate entities such as “ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, CNN, The New York Times,
The Washington Post (which also publishes Newsweek magazine), The Wall Street Journal,
Gannett (which publishes various papers, including USA Today), Time magazine, Associated
Press (AP), and United Press International (UPI)

150

are responsible for forming our opinions

about what is going on in the world.
As stated by Edwin C. Baker, “the health of democracies . . . depends on having a free
press.”151 Baker regards the media as crucial to democracy in that it is essentially the middleman
for public will formation and state will formation.152 This echoes the beliefs of our founding
fathers in forming the First Amendment as discussed in Part I. In Giving the Audience What it
Wants, Baker explains that media products are different from a typical product on the free
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market.153 Media is a public good that is more similar to that of utilities or other natural
monopolies. For utilities, while there is a cost to initially produce and create the infrastructure for
the goods to reach the consumer, adding an additional consumer will result in marginal cost to
the producer. This is similar to the media, where a company might spend “huge amounts to
gather, write, and edit news or create and produce video entertainment. However, little cost is
added no matter how many people access the media.154 Therefore, the result in reaching a bigger
audience will be more profit.
Despite media being more similar to a public good, media is treated the same as any other
free market or at least those that argue against regulation of the media argue that it should be.
However, Baker contends that the quality of media content is adversely affected when the market
determines performance:
First, to survive, a market participant needs to capture at least
enough revenue to replace its capital—that is, to cover its costs.
Second, given this first constraint and given competition, the firm
must provide a product at a price that satisfies consumers as well
as does everything that its competitors can supply at that price.
This structurally-created dynamic dictates a profit maximization
orientation . . . . Thus, the market-based firm must try to fulfill the
money-backed preferences of its customers as cheaply as
possible—if it does not it will be undersold by a competitor and
eventually go bankrupt.155
Baker notes two problems that are not necessarily true but may have some weight. The first
problem Baker notes is that media owners do not know what content will maximize profit.
Therefore, they will attempt different content strategies not based on market performance. The
systematic error leaves room for different owners to make choices influenced by their own
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personal ideology “without sacrificing the profits needed to avoid bankruptcy.”156 The second
reason he provides is that because media is characteristically similar to public goods, the market
tends to act with monopolistic attributes, which distinguish it from pure competition.157 The
products do not have adequate substitutes and media companies can make substantial profit.
Media owners can then invest these profits on indulging their own choices about content or price.
While it is true that the above scenarios provided by Baker could potentially occur when
media is treated like any other preference driven market, another theory about the problem with
concentration in the media industry is more accurate. Baker is correct that in a free market, a
firm must try to fulfill the money-backed preferences of its customers as cheaply as possible.
However, due to the fact that the media is a public good with monopolistic characteristics, the
true problem is not the potential influence that owners have to support their viewpoints, but
rather that the quality of content, in general, suffers.
What has happened in the media industry is more similar to how James T. Hamilton
described it in The News that’s Fit to Sell in that the few firms that remain put more time into
soft news than hard news. In other words, the media is putting more into stories that readers find
personally interesting, such those that may help them with their jobs “or what products they are
thinking about buying.”158 These soft news stories require little cost and effort to make.159 In
creating a hard news story, a corporation would have to spend money and time to have a reporter
and team go overseas to report on a war or other foreign relations. Further, a hard news story
could require hours and hours of research into documents and interviewing witnesses and
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government officials, which may not produce anything helpful or useful for the story. 160 Upon
finishing a hard news story, the audience for that story is not nearly as diverse as the audience for
a soft news story. Additionally, the audience most interested in soft news stories tends to be
young female women as they are the ones usually responsible for making buying decisions in a
household.161 As such, advertisers are more interested in the attention of the young female
audience who will decide whether to purchase their products. Advertisers are also attracted to the
larger audience of these soft news stories. As a result, advertisers pay more for advertisements
within soft news stories than hard news stories, thus, making it more profitable for media
companies to produce and distribute or broadcast soft news.
Bias in the media has also resulted from the focus of these media conglomerates on
making a profit. As discussed above, the three major network evening news programs began to
focus their attention on retaining young female viewers because they “carry a greater premium in
the advertising market.”162 The result was that these network news programs devoted more time
and stories to liberal issues, such as gun control and education, which tend to be more associated
with the Democratic party.163 The bias of the big three evening news programs left the
conservative audience niche wide open and Fox News came in to fill the void.164
This method of conscious product positioning of major news outlets has been termed by
Hamilton as the “spatial model of news product locations.”165 The spatial model can be
illustrated when there are two competing firms in a market who each want to get the largest
audience possible. The competitors will attempt to meet the varying preferences of as many
160
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consumers as possible while placing themselves far enough away from the competitor to
differentiate itself.166
The spatial model can also explain the trend toward soft news on television, newspapers,
radio, and even the internet. Because the conglomerates that own these information providing
sources have so many outlets including many cable television channels, motion picture and other
entertainment outlets, they can report on and promote the reality tv stars, late night hosts, news
anchors, radio shock jocks, and movie stars that are part of their own media network rather than
other media networks. In doing so, they differentiate the soft news that they distribute to the
audience. Essentially, this allows the conglomerate to increase the entertainment value of their
news coverage to a wider audience interested in these various entertainers thereby keeping the
cost of producing the news down as well as serving as a promotion to the conglomerate’s other
ventures.
The spatial model also helps determine the mix of hard and soft news that is placed in
their programming. “Viewers vary in the degree that they want to know about the details of
politics and government.”167 Therefore, the extent of hard news or soft news placed in a
particular program will depend on the demographics of those that tune in to the program.168
The resulting problem with the increasing soft news and party bias of the different
networks is that people are less informed and are not receiving information from diverse
viewpoints. Because of the media’s focus on soft news, people are receiving less information
about politics and the government. Further, the politics that are discussed on a station’s news
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programming are biased to a particular party, thereby, forcing opinions upon their viewers
without providing an adequate assessment of the facts.
Both of these problems discussed are defeating the purpose that the founding fathers had
intended for freedom of the press in our First Amendment. As discussed in Part I, the founders
believed strongly in the necessity of the freedom of the press to serve as a checking power on the
government. Without the press, the government could expand the reach of its power in its own
self-interest by punishing those that may disagree with its decisions or judgments. Today, our
media corporations have been placed in the hands of a few individuals focused mainly on
making a profit. They place soft news on their programs that once served to educate and inform
the public. This resulting lack of information means people are unaware of any wrongdoing by
the government, thereby completing diminishing the value of the press to check the power of the
government.
Additionally, bias in the media means that voters are only receiving positive information
about their elected officials without hearing the other side. By looking at a political map of the
United States, it would be seen that different regions tend to elect members of one party. 169 This
means that the news the majority of that region chooses to watch will tend to fill the niche of the
party they most identify with. The news station they watch the most will support that party and
only discuss the wrongdoing by the other party. Any wrongdoing by their own elected official
will probably not get covered except by the media coverage dedicated to the other party that only
a minority of that region watches. This greatly reduces the checking value of the First
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Amendment that serves such an important purpose to the success of our democracy as it was
intended by our founders.
Another reason the media being in the hands of so few defeats the checking value of the
First Amendment is that it essentially works as a fourth branch of government. Because
structural regulation has been rejected recently by courts based on the corporation’s supposed
First Amendment freedom of the press protection170, the power of the media in the hands of the
few has made it easier for government officials to receive positive press in the media come
election time. For example, when Murdoch was trying to expand News Corporation, an
Australian company, into the United States he was faced with a law preventing foreign
corporations from owning more than 24.9% of a US radio or television station.171 The moves
Murdoch pulled are best described by Bagdikian:
[H]e used his new American power base of four newspapers and
two magazines as levers for his legendary political behind-thescenes navigating to obtain special favors. It was a shock to other
foreign firms, which had attempted but never succeeded in entering
U.S. broadcasting, when Murdoch was granted the first waiver of
the United States—only ownership law that have ever been
granted.172
Murdoch serves as a perfect example of how the media fails to check the government.
Rather than criticize government officials when it is due, those that are in charge of the media
can use their power over the government to serve their own self interests. By using its powerful
influence over public opinion to favor government officials, the government officials will in turn
give the corporations what they want. This is probably why our government has done away with
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structural antitrust regulation of media companies and allowed them to become so big. Bagdikian
sums it up nicely:
Their steady accumulation of power in the world of news, radio,
television, magazines, books, and movies gave them a steady
accumulation of power in politics. Political leaders and parties
know that the news media control how those politicians are
depicted to the voting public; the more powerful the leading media,
the more powerful their influence over politicians and national
policy. Prudent politicians treat the desires of all large corporations
with care. But politicians treat the country’s most powerful media
corporations with something approaching reverence.173
In addition to failing to serve as a check on power which was the founder’s fundamental
purpose in the First Amendment freedom of the press, the present media industry fails in
providing another important purpose served by the First Amendment. By allowing the media to
be run by a few individuals, viewpoint diversity suffers. Viewpoint diversity is an essential
aspect of the egalitarian theory started by Mill. Further, many Supreme Court decisions
regarding the First Amendment have rested their reasoning on the necessity of viewpoint
diversity. A successful democracy depends on open expression of opinions in order to challenge
our own beliefs in search of the truth. In the case of media viewership, individuals tune in to the
program with the particular bias that they identify with. As such, other viewpoints are completely
ignored. People do not receive the facts necessary to get themselves closer to the truth but rather
their own beliefs are continuously reaffirmed. This is beneficial to a media firm’s ownership as it
allows them to place their product in a niche and have guaranteed consumers to meet their own
goal of achieving a profit. The result is an uninformed public with little understanding of the
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world around them thereby defeating the marketplace of ideas that should be such an important
aspect of our Freedom of Speech.
Viewpoint diversity has failed in a more obvious respect due to the limited amount of
owners. As described above, we receive less information in the form of soft news and political
bias. However, perhaps the limited political information that we do get is only provided to us in
in such a way to that only supports the beliefs of these few owners. Because the media is in the
hands of a few corporate elite individuals with quid-pro-quo relationships with government
officials, the views provided will only be provided in such a way that benefits these few
individuals. This leads the question: Are they giving us the information that we want or the
information that they tell us we want?
IV. PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM
Various proposals can be made to reduce the adverse effects that media conglomerization
has on our First Amendment. First, the FCC could return to the media industry specific
regulations that existed prior to the changes that took place in 1984. For example, returning to a
rule similar to the seven station rule as to television and radio station ownership so as to prevent
the big five from obtaining a bigger share of any media outlets would be a good start.
Second, more can be done to reduce the barriers of entry to new entrants into the media
industry. For example, the government could subsidize certain projects that it qualifies to be
beneficial to the public interest.174 It could financially support radio or television programming
that provide debates on varying political topics. Rather than having the same hosts and speakers
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every day that acquire celebrity status, they can have varying hosts and speakers that air and
focus the attention primarily on the debate. It could also make the ability for smaller ventures
unrelated to the current media conglomerates easier to receive a license to broadcast over the
radio. The government can similarly require cable providers to have more channels that can be
dedicated to new entrants that seek to offer a new perspective that may be beneficial to the public
interest at a limited cost.
Third, the government should require news programs to provide a right of reply to any
individuals that disagree with an opinion that was aired on a program. The government should
also require each network to have a specific webpage for every television program, radio
program, or newspaper journalist, which most of them do already. The government can then
require that a link to a right of reply page be placed in a visible place on that webpage.
Fourth, the government should require that the big five television networks provide an
hour each night of unbiased news coverage or debate regarding hard news topics only.
Fifth, the Supreme Court should get rid of the intermediate and strict scrutiny analyses
established in Turner and be more supportive of the structural regulation decisions of the FCC
made as to the media industry. The FCC’s responsibility to regulate the media industry is more
difficult as it must weigh both economic policy considerations with public interest
considerations, such as diversity viewpoint. Because of the importance of the First Amendment
freedom of the press in informing the public, checking government power, and allowing all
views to enter the marketplace of ideas, when in doubt the FCC should be able to lean toward
regulating rather than deregulating and not have to worry that the Supreme Court will be
checking its every move.
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Finally, the last proposal would be to adjust the language of the First Amendment to
Madison’s early draft, which stated: “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right
to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great
bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”175 This will support the original intention of the First
Amendment which was to enable the people to have freedom of the press and not let the
government or any small group that are members of the corporate elite control the media. This
will also enable the above proposals to be enacted without the owners of media conglomerates
contending that any regulation of their industry violates the freedom specifically intended to be
given to the press, as an industry. The First Amendment freedom of the press was not intended
for them, it was intended for the people.
Conclusion
In Part I, this paper showed that the First Amendment freedom of the press was intended
by the founding fathers to provide a check on the government by giving all people the ability to
publish through the press. Further, it showed how the egalitarian theory that the marketplace of
ideas enabled by the freedom of the press is a necessary aspect to a successful democracy. This
idea is supported by the Supreme Court throughout its history until recently. Part II of this paper
showed how deregulation of the media industry began to occur following the recent rise of the
Chicago School that those businesses with significant market share and power are more efficient
for the market and less costly to the consumer. The FCC began to deregulate media specific
regulations. Further, the Supreme Court began to look at regulation of the industry with strict
scrutiny and lower courts started to reject any antitrust regulation of the media industry. This
enabled the rise of the Big Five media conglomerates. Part III showed how the concentrated
ownership of the media results in a less informed public because the corporate bottom line to
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turn a profit has resulted in more soft news as well as politically biased coverage. This has
greatly discouraged the purpose of the freedom of the press in providing a check on government
power and serving the public interest in providing a diversity of viewpoints. Finally, Part IV
discussed some possible prescriptions for reform that include returning to the regulatory policies
that existed prior to the changes that took place in the 1980s (including overturning the
intermediate and strict scrutiny analysis of Turner), providing government subsidies to new
entrants and otherwise reducing the barriers to entry, mandating that networks provide a certain
amount of time each night to the public interest, and finally, this paper proposed rewriting the
First Amendment to meet the purposes for which it was intended. Those purposes are to serve as
a check on government power, support diverse viewpoints in the marketplace of ideas, and lastly,
to provide freedom of the press to all.
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